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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS: REFINING THE STANDARD
The qualified immunity doctrine protects public officials 1 from
liability for civil rights violations committed during the exercise of
their discretionary duties. 2 The doctrine originally was developed
to protect law enforcement officials against civil suits stemming
from either a Bivens3 or a section 19834 civil rights claim. 5 The
Supreme Court justified the qualified immunity doctrine as necessary for officials to perform their governmental functions
effectively. 6
As the doctrine developed, the Court broadened the category
of public officials entitled to the doctrine's protection. 7 For many of
these officials, particularly in the upper reaches of government, the
Court perceived a need to provide protection from frivolous litigation and potential liability for damages. 8 To increase the scope of
the doctrine's protection, the Court narrowed the qualifying test for
immunity to a purely objective inquiry9 in the hope that lower courts
would be able to dismiss "insubstantial" suits at the complaint stage
or on a motion for summary judgment.10
While expanding the scope and substance of the qualified immunity doctrine, the Court has nevertheless refused to tailor the
1 Some officials, such as the President, legislators, judges and prosecutors, are
granted absolute immunity for performance of their discretionary duties. See infra text
accompanying notes 47-59.
2 See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974). The doctrine currently bars suits against officials unless the right they violate is "clearly established." See infra text accompanying notes 127-37.
A discussion of the meaning of a "discretionary" as opposed to "ministerial" duty is
beyond the scope of this Note. The majority opinion is that the distinction is basically a
policy decision, based on considerations such as the type of injury, the availability of
alternative remedies, and the importance of the right being protected. For a full investigation of the dichotomy, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D, comment f
(1969); Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1965).
3
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
4
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871).
5 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967).
6 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481 (1978).
7 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (United States Attorney General);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (Presidential aides); Butz, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)
(Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974) (Governor of Ohio).
8 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814-15.
9

10

Id. at 817-18; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813.
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standard to the disparate needs of different levels of government
officials." The Court's refusal to calibrate the qualified immunity
standard, coupled with the greater range of officials to whom the
standard applies, has led to the overprotection of lower-level government officials. A lower-level official, for the purposes of this
Note, is an official who generally deals with the public directly,
whose individual decisions tend to affect a relatively small number
of people, and who is usually one of many individuals employed in
the same capacity. 12 An upper-level official, on the other hand, is
one who individually exercises great authority over a large group of
lower-level officials or the public, and is usually solely responsible
for the duties of their office.' 3 The current standard provides too
much protection for lower-level officials, 14 and gives little guidance
to lower courts in suits where the official's state of mind is an element of the plaintiff's case. 15
This Note argues that government-sponsored indemnity and
insurance programs for civil rights violations would provide the
most complete and appropriate solution to the problems of immunity for lower-level public officials. Adoption of these programs
would allow complete abrogation of qualified immunity for these officials, benefiting victims of unconstitutional acts, government officials, and the legal system.
In the alternative, this Note argues for the bifurcation of the
qualified immunity doctrine to better meet the needs of different
categories of officials while simultaneously preserving as many of
plaintiffs' constitutional remedies as sound public policy allows. As
the Court has recognized, qualified immunity sacrifices some individuals' constitutional rights in the interest of effective government. 16 Because the doctrine denies injured inaividuals a remedy
11 Creighton, 483 U.S. at 643 ("[W]e have been unwilling to complicate qualified
immunity analysis by making the scope or extent of immunity turn on the precise nature
of various officials' duties ....
).
12
Typical examples of lower-level officials include police officers, FBI agents,
school principals, and prison guards. For an analogous category, see Professor Schuck's
conceptualization of "street-level" officials in Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The
Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officialsfor Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REV. 281, 29394. Schuck defines "street-level" officials as those who personally deliver basic governmental services to the public, and "exercise substantial discretion in doing so." Id. at
293.
13
This category should be narrowly defined, including only those officials to whom
the special policy concerns voiced by the Court genuinely apply. See infra text accompanying notes 141-49. Examples of upper-level officials would include the United States
Attorney General, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), or a state governor, see
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
14 See Creighton, 483 U.S. 635; see also infra text accompanying notes 156-62.
15 See infra note 155.
16
See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 242; infra text accompanying notes 64-73.
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for violations of their constitutional rights, it should be narrowly tailored to effectuate only the purpose for which it was intended.
This Note argues that a closer fit between the competing interests of individual rights and effective government can be accomplished by dividing the category of "public officials" into two
separate classes: upper-level and lower-level officials. Upper-level
officials, due to the special policy concerns implicated, 17 should be
granted immunity before trial if they can prove that the right vio18
lated was not "clearly established" at the time of their action.
1
9
Lower-level officials, however, should only be granted immunity if
they can prove both that the right was not clearly established and
that they held a "good-faith" belief as to the constitutionality of
20
their actions.
I
BACKGROUND

A.

Constitutional Remedies

The qualified immunity doctrine grew out of the use of section
1983 and the Bivens doctrine by individuals seeking redress for violations of their constitutional rights. 2 ' The Court's expansive reading of section 1983,22 and its announcement of a new cause of
23
action in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics,
created the potential for a vast increase in personal liability for federal and state officials. The Court reacted to this new potential for
liability by carving out pockets of immunity for certain classes of
24
officials.
1. Section 1983
At its inception, section 198325 was specifically intended as a
17
18
19

See infra text accompanying notes 141-44.
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Creighton, 483 U.S. at 643; infra notes 117, 126.
See supra note 12.
20
This two-prong standard was the rule until the Court's ruling in Harlow. See, e.g.,
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
21 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1344-45 (2d Cir. 1972).
22
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v.
Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1977); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
overruled by Monell, 436 U.S. 658.
23 Bivens, 403 U.S. 388.
24
See infra text accompanying notes 47-73.
25 Section 1983 reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
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response to the systematic violence and injustice against southern
blacks in the wake of the Civil War. 26 The Act, written in broad
terms, provides a remedy against "any person" who, under color of
state law, deprives any person of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws .... 27
Since 1961, the Supreme Court has expanded the coverage of
section 1983 to fit its sweeping language.28 In Monroe v. Pape,29 the
Court held that section 1983 provides a remedy for any constitutional violation committed under color of state law.3 0 Since this
landmark decision, lower courts have permitted use of section 1983
to remedy a wide variety of constitutional violations far beyond the
original, limited purpose of the Act. 3 '
Prior to Monroe, the Court had been unclear about whether the
phrase "under color of state law" included officials' actions not
mandated by the law of their state. 32 Monroe resolved this issue by
holding that "under color of state law" in the context of section
1983 includes actions that are illegal under state law, as long as the
misuse of power was made possible only because the violator was
"clothed with the authority of state law . . .,,3
Monroe vastly increased the scope of unconstitutional acts section 1983 covered. Together with the Court's later ruling in Monell
v. Department of Social Services of New York, 3 4 Monroe imposed liability
on individual officials rather than on municipalities themselves. The
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (Section 1983 is also known as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan
Act of 1871.).
26 See generally CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, app. at 78 (1871) (comments
of Representative Perry of Ohio, March 31, 1971); PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 47 (1983); Theodore Eisenberg, Section
1983: Doctrinal Foundationsand an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 484 (1982).
27 See supra note 25.
28 See generally ROBERT H. FREILICH & RICHARD G. CARLISLE, SECrION 1983: SWORD
AND SHIELD (1983); Schuck, supra note 12; Eisenberg, supra note 26.
29 365 U.S. 167 (1961), rev'd, Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
30 Id. at 171.
31
See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1145-46 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 481 U.S. 107 (1987) (The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the automatic enforcement of a Texas lien bond of $12 billion deprived Texaco of its right to appeal by
effectively destroying the company, and that this deprivation stated a section 1983 cause
of action. Although later reversed on other grounds, this case illustrates how courts
have stretched Section 1983 to cover injuries well beyond the civil rights violations it
originally was intended to remedy).
32
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). But see Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
33
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184 (quoting Classic, 313 U.S. at 326).
34
436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also infra text accompanying notes 181-89.
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Monell Court held that although local and municipal governments
could be sued under section 1983 for violations if they were directly
liable, they could not be held liable under the theory of respondeat
superior.35 This partial immunity for municipalities often left the of36
fending official as the sole defendant.
2.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau Of
37

Narcotics

Bivens is the federal action analog to section 1983.38 In Bivens,
the Supreme Court implied a private right of action for violations of
constitutional rights by federal officials-an area not covered by section 1983. In Bivens, the plaintiff's complaint arose from a warrantless search of his apartment by federal agents. After finding that the
search violated Bivens' fourth amendment rights, the Court implied
a private cause of action for damages to vindicate those rights. 39
35

Id. at 692. Direct liability, as contemplated in Monell, would arise if the unconsti-

tutional action was the result of the execution of a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or officially adopted decision of the municipality itself. See id. at 690.
36
At least one commentator believes that executive officials were granted only
qualified immunity because, after Monell and Monroe had immunized cities and the Court
had begun to immunize officials performing judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions, individual executive officials were the only ones left to hold liable. Immunizing
executive officials as well would have drained section 1983 of all meaning. See Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 501-02.
37
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
38 See Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 468; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504
(1978) (holding that the qualified immunity standard was identical for both section 1983
and Bivens claims.).
39 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392. In reaching its conclusion, the Court ruled that the
fourth amendment guarantees citizens an "absolute right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority." Id. Then, relying on
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), the Court recognized that an invasion of this absolute right required the courts to "adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary
relief," and that, in this case, money damages were the proper remedy to "make good
the wrong done." Bivens, 403 U.S. at 392 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684). Recovery
under a Bivens action, as under section 1983, is limited to compensatory damages unless
the defendant demonstrates "reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights" or
"intentional violations of federal law." See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51 (1983).
The Bivens holding represented a major change in the concept of liability for government officials. For a more complete discussion of the basis and implications of the
Bivens case, see Michael P. Lehman, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of A Constitutional
Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531
(1977); Schuck, supra note 12; Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusionof a Constitutional Cause of Action, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1988); Note, The Constitution as Positive
Law: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 5 Lov.
L.A.L. REV. 126 (1972) (authored by Richard W. Wright); Note, "Damages or Nothing"The Efficacy of the Bivens-Type Remedy, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 667 (1979) (authored by W.
Mark Smith); Note, FederalAgents Conducting UnreasonableSearches and Seizures are Liablefor
Damages Under the FourthAmendment, 50 TEx. L. REV. 798 (1972); Note, The Truly Constitutional Tort, 33 U. P=rr. L. REV. 271 (1971) (authored by Gary V. Skiba); Comment, Tort
Liability of Law Enforcement Officers-Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of The Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 943 (1973)
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Since Bivens, both the Supreme Court and the lower courts have
implied private causes of action to protect a broad category of constitutional rights. 40 The sweeping language of the case, and the expansive reading the Court has given it, suggest that Bivens may
provide a remedy as broad as that of section 1983.41
B.

Immunities

Section 1983 and the Bivens doctrine greatly enhanced an individual's opportunity to seek redress when public officials violated
their constitutional rights. But by interpreting section 1983 as
prohibiting vicarious liability for municipalities, and by holding the
FBI agents in Bivens personally liable, the Court ensured that the
burden of any damages arising from a Bivens or section 1983 claim
would fall most often on the individual official, rather than the gov42
ernment entity.
Confronted by the prospect of increased liability for public officials, the Court had to decide whether the traditional common-law
immunities that protected public officials applied to this new class of
civil rights claim. 43 The language of section 1983 makes no mention
of immunities. 4 4 Nevertheless, drawing on what some commentators view as questionable precedent and public policy concerns, 4 5
the Court developed a scheme of immunities to protect public offi(authored byJ. Michael Fried); Comment, Bivens and the Creation of a Cause of Action for
Money Damages Arising Directly From the Due Process Clauses, 29 EMoRY LJ. 231 (1980) (authored byJohn Vian); Comment, The Fourth Amendment: Is a Lawsuit the Answer?, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1227 (1972) (authored by Richard J. Sabat).
40
In addition to Bivens, which implied a right of action under the fourth amendment, see, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 140 (1980) (eighth amendment); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (individual had an implied damage remedy for violations
of his fifth amendment rights); Briggs v. Goodwin, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (fourth amendment); Kotarski v. Cooper, 799 F.2d 1342
(9th Cir. 1986) (ninth amendment); Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d. Cir. 1978) (fourteenth amendment); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (first amendment).
41 See generally P. SCHUCK, supra note 26; Eisenberg, supra note 26.
42 Monell, by holding that local municipalities and government agencies could not
be held liable under respondeat superior, foreclosed a suit against the government entity
unless it was directly liable. In all other cases, only the official himself would be held
liable. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692. In Bivens, the Supreme Court mentioned only individual
liability when finding the implied cause of action. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. Additionally,
the Supreme Court more recently held in Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979),
that section 1983 did not abrogate the traditional immunity of states from suit provided
by the eleventh amendment.
43 See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
(1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
44 See supra note 25.
45 See Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 448; Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedyfor Law Enforcers'Misconduct,87 YALE L.J.
447 (1978).
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cials from both Bivens and section 1983 liability. 46

1. Absolute Immunity
49
48
The Court has granted judges, 4 7 legislators, prosecutors,
and the President 50 absolute immunity in suits arising under section
1983 or the Bivens doctrine. To qualify for absolute immunity, these
officials must have acted within the scope of their discretionary duties, 5 1 and (aside from the President) must be performing functions
of either a judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial nature. 52 Members
of the executive branch also may claim absolute immunity if they are
53
performing judicial, legislative, or prosecutorial functions.
The Supreme Court extended absolute immunity to Bivens and
section 1983 claims on the grounds of general public policy and a
combination of loosely analogous common-law immunities. For
judges or officials performing judicial functions, the Court noted the
long-standing common-law tradition of judicial immunity, 54 the
public policy benefits of protecting judges, and the absence, in the
face of this long-standing immunity, of language in section 1983
abolishing the common-law immunity. 55
The Court reasoned similarly in extending absolute immunity
46

See infra text accompanying notes 47-73.
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); Bradley
v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872).
48 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
49 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976).
50 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
51
See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422; see also Schuck, supra note 12, at 319. Discretionary duties may be administrative in nature, and therefore not within the "scope" prong
of the test. The key rationale for protecting the execution of duties within either the
prosecutorial, judicial or legislative scope of the officials' actions was the need for officials to make these types of decisions without fear of personal liability.
52 See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (judges immune unless they acted in clear absence
of jurisdiction); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 (prosecutor immune while performing
prosecutorial, rather than investigative or administrative functions); Tenney, 341 U.S. at
377 (legislators immune while acting "as legislators"). Compare Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219 (1988) (judges not absolutely immune from liability and damages for administrative, legislative or executive functions). See generally Schuck, supra note 12, at 319
("The Court has extended absolute immunity from damage actions to acts of ajudicial,
legislative, and prosecutorial nature .... ").
53 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 521 (1985) (Attorney General absolutely
immune when performing prosecutorial, but not investigative, duties); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978) (Department of Agriculture officials who performed
prosecutorial or judicial functions absolutely immune).
54 Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (noting the importance the Court in Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872), placed on the freedom ofjudges to act without apprehension of personal consequences).
55
Stump, 435 U.S. at 356; see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967) ("The
legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
We presume that Congress would have specifically so
common-law immunities ....
provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine."); Bradley, 80 U.S. 335.
47
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to prosecutors5 6 and legislators. 57 Commentators have sharply criticized the reasoning of many of these opinions. The main focus of
these criticisms has been the questionable applicability of commonlaw traditions to civil rights violations, 58 and the slippery-slope reasoning of the Court's public policy rationales-which seem to lead
to the conclusion that all government officials should be granted ab59
solute immunity.
2.

Qualified Immunity

Virtually all public officials who either cannot claim absolute
immunity, or can claim absolute immunity for only some of their
public functions, 60 may claim qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense. 6 1 Under the current standard, qualified immunity protects
officials acting within the scope of their discretionary duties unless
their conduct violates clearly established constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. 62 Additionally, even
if the court finds that the right violated is clearly established, the
official can still avoid liability if he can prove that he "neither knew
'6 3
nor should have known of the relevant legal standard.
56 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23.
57 See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 ("We cannot believe that Congress-itself a staunch
advocate of legislative freedom-would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language [of section 1983] before
us."). In extending absolute immunity to legislators, the Court also relied on the
Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("[F]or any Speech or Debate in
either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other
Place.").
58 See Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 494.
59 P. SCHUCK, supra note 26, at 90-91. Schuck argues that the main policy concerns
expressed by the Court in Bradley and Stump in granting judges absolute immunity are:
the need for judges to be free from apprehension of personal consequences from their
judicial decisions; the controversy and importance of the issues; the record keeping
judges would resort to in the absence of immunity; the availability of the alternative
remedies on appeal; and the ease with which bad-faith could be alleged apply equally to
bureaucrats. Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 494-95 (arguing that the English
parliamentary privilege, much relied upon by the Court in Tenney, has little application
in deciding whether to grant immunity to members of a state legislature.).
60 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (U.S. Attorney General, while absolutely immune for his prosecutorial actions, only entitled to qualified immunity for his
investigative actions).
61 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). The Supreme Court has
granted qualified immunity to a wide variety of officials. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S.
Attorney General in his investigative capacity); Harlow, 457 U.S. 800 (Presidential aides);
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (Secretary of Agriculture); Wood v. Strickland,
421 U.S. 308 (1975) (local school board members); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232
(1974) (Governor of Ohio); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (police officers entitled
to limited immunity).
62 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The
meaning of "clearly established" is discussed infra note 126.
63 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819; see infra note 99.
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II
PURPOSES OF THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

Soon after it began expanding the scope of section 1983, the
Supreme Court recognized that law enforcement and other officials
needed a margin of error for actions they took in the course of their
official duties.6 4 The Court reasoned that, although any protection
from a damage claim would leave some individuals without a remedy, some protection was necessary to allow officials to perform
their work adequately. 6 5 Without this protection, officials would
work in constant fear that their good faith actions might accidentally
violate an individual's constitutional rights, thereby exposing them
67
to liability. 66 Acting on this reasoning, the Court, in Piersonv. Ray,
held that law enforcement officials accused of constitutional violations under section 1983 were entitled to a good faith defense
68
against claims for damages.
Thus, the Court viewed the qualified immunity doctrine from
its inception as a pragmatic compromise, necessary to accommodate
the conflicting goals of protecting individual rights and facilitating
the "effective operation of government." 6 9 In creating the doctrine
of qualified immunity, the Court consciously decided to sacrifice
some measure of constitutional protection to facilitate the effective
operation of government.
Some sacrifice of individual rights for the sake of effective government is the inevitable price of living in a society organized and
run by fallible human beings. 70 The early common law recognized
that the threat of personal liability might prevent officials from executing their duties with the necessary decisiveness. 7 1 The framers
embodied this recognition in the Constitution. 72 Indecisiveness
64
See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555 ("A policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has
probable cause, and being mulcted in [section 1983] damages if he does."); see also discussion of Pierson, infra text accompanying notes 74-82.
65 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
66 See id. at 242 ("Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-absolute
or qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity
assumes this and goes on to that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from
such error than not to decide or act at all.").
67 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
68 See id. The Pierson holding is discussed in greater detail infra at notes 74-82 and
accompanying text.
69 See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 242 ("The concept of immunity assumes ... that it is
better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to decide at all.").
70 See id.
71
See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872); Missouri ex. rel.
Ward v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 179 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1950); Respublica v.
Sparhawk, I U.S. 357, 361-63 (Pa. 1788).
72 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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caused by fear of personal liability can lead to grave public harm.
For example, a mayor may decide not to demolish a row of houses
to provide a fire-break if he thinks he will subsequently be held lia73
ble for destroying the homes.
This trade-off rationale implies that the protection that the
qualified immunity doctrine supplies should be closely tailored to
the needs of different levels of public officials. It should give no
more protection than is necessary for the official to effectively fulfill
his duties because each additional measure of protection divests victims of a greater range of remedies for violations of their constitutional rights. Providing more protection than is necessary to
prevent officials from being unduly inhibited in the performance of
their duties results in an unjustifiable sacrifice of individual constitutional rights.
A.

Development of the Qualified Immunity Doctrine
1. Early Development: 1967-82

In Pierson v. Ray, 74 the Court first acknowledged the availability
of a good faith defense for public officials. The Pierson Court held
that police officers who arrested several black ministers in a "whites
only" area of a train station were immune from damages from a section 1983 claim as long as they "reasonably believed in good faith
that the arrest was constitutional. ' '7 5 This defense was valid even if
76
it later turned out that the arrest was in fact unconstitutional.
Although the Pierson Court did not explicitly recognize it, the requirement that the officers' belief be both reasonable, and in good
faith 7 7 contains both objective and subjective aspects. The Court's
analogy to the common-law defense available to police officers accused of false arrest in creating the new immunity in Pierson
78
strengthens this reading of the case.
The Pierson Court engaged in a three-step analysis in deciding
to apply the common-law false arrest defense to section 1983 actions. First, the Court cited its previous decisions holding that, by
passing section 1983, Congress did not intend to abolish the common-law defenses of public officials. 79 Second, the Court noted
73
74
75
76

See Respublica, I U.S. at 357, 363 (Pa. 1788).
386 U.S. 547 (1967).
Id. at 557.

Id.
Id.
78 Id. at 555. The common-law false arrest defense requires an actual (subjective)
good faith belief that also is objectively reasonable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
§ 121 (1965); 1 FOWLER V.: HARPER, FLEMING JAMES & OSCAR J. GRAY, THE LAW OF
77

TORTS § 3.18, at 277-78 (2d ed. 1986).
79 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55. The Court previously had made this determination

472

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:462

that, as a general rule, a police officer who makes an arrest is not
liable for the common law tort of false arrest if he can prove he
acted in good faith and with probable cause.8 0 Analogizing from
this standard, the Court derived the qualified immunity standard for
section 1983 actions, substituting "reasonable belief" for "probable
cause."8 1 The Court also based its grant of qualified immunity on
fairness grounds, stating that "[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy
that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty
if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted
8 2
in damages if he does."
After introducing the qualified immunity doctrine in Pierson v.
Ray, the Court waited seven years before reexamining its scope. In
Scheuer v. Rhodes,8 3 the Court clarified both the qualified immunity
test and the policies supporting it. Scheuer also marked the beginning of a consistent practice of the Court in qualified immunity
cases: narrowing the class of officials entitled to absolute immunity.8 4 Limiting the availability of absolute immunity, however, had
in Tenney, in deciding that Congress had not meant by section 1983 to implicitly abolish
the traditional immunity ofjudges. See text accompanying notes 54-57. The Court also
noted that, in Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187, it stated that section 1983 "should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions." Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556. The use of this language, which
in Monroejustified the imposition of liability, to find a basis for extending immunity in Pierson, has been sharply criticized. See Newman, supra note 45, at 459.
80 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555:
The common law never has granted police officers an absolute and
unqualified immunity, and the officers in this case did not claim that they
were entitled to one. Their claim rather was that they should not have
been held liable if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in
making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid. Under the
prevailing view in this country, a peace officer who arrests someone with
probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply because the innocence
of the subject is later proved.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 121 (1965).
81 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557.
82 Id. at 555.
83 Scheuer, 416 U.S. 232 (Governor of Ohio entitled to qualified, not absolute, immunity). The Scheuer case arose out of the killing of several students by the National
Guard on the campus of Kent State during an anti-Vietnam war demonstration.
Scheuer also held that the immunity applied to discretionary acts, and that the scope
of the immunity would depend upon the scope of the official's discretion and responsibility. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247. The court has not yet clarified the difference between
discretionary and ministerial, and several commentators and courts have concluded that
policy considerations (i.e., whether the official should be granted immunity) rather than
substantive distinctions are behind the different labels. See Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or.
485, 475 P.2d 78 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 895D comment f (1965); L.
JAFFE, supra note 2, at 241.
84 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985) (Attorney General entitled
to only qualified immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810 (1982) (Presidential
aides entitled to only qualified immunity); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978)
(Cabinet officials only entitled to qualified immunity); see also infra text accompanying
notes 138-47.
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the reciprocal effect of enlarging the class of officials entitled to
qualified immunity, because officials denied absolute immunity consistently were allowed to raise qualified immunity as a defense.8 5
The qualified immunity test enunciated in Scheuer clearly set out
the two prongs implicitly suggested in Pierson. The Scheuer Court
held that to pass the test for qualified immunity, a government official must meet two criteria: 1) an official must have had reasonable
grounds to believe that his actions were constitutional, and 2) the
86
official must have acted in good faith.
ChiefJustice Burger, writing for the majority, offered two rationales in support of the qualified immunity defense. First, he stated
that it was unfair to hold a government official liable if he mistakenly, but in good faith, violated an individual's rights during the
course of his duties.8 7 Second, he noted that some protection was
necessary to permit government officials to exercise their discretion
without undue fear of liability for honest mistakes. 8 Chief Justice
Burger explicitly recognized the pragmatic trade-off the qualified
immunity defense represented:
Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-absolute or
qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The
concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume that it is
better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than
not to decide or act at all. 8 9
The Court explicitly recognized the separate objective and subjective nature of its two-prong test one year later in Wood v. Strickland.90 In Wood, a section 1983 suit brought against upper-level
school administrators, the Court held that for qualified immunity to
apply, the official must have acted sincerely and with "a belief that
he is doing right" (the subjective prong), and also must not have
violated "clearly established constitutional rights," whether out of
ignorance or disregard (objective prong).9 ' This "knew or should
have known" test prevailed from 1975 to 1982,92 when the Court
85 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511; Harlow, 457 U.S. 800; Butz, 438 U.S. 478; Wood, 421
U.S. 308; Scheuer, 416 U.S. 232.
86
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48. Justice Burger wrote that "[i]t is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct." Id
87

Id. at 240.

88

Id.
Id at 242.

89

90 Wood, 420 U.S. at 321-22. The action arose when several high schools students
were expelled by the local school board for spiking punch at a school party. The plaintiffs alleged that the board deprived them of their rights to due process.
91
92

Id.

The Court also continued to expand the class of officials entitled to only quali-
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decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald.93
2.

Harlow and its Progeny: Discardingthe Subjective Prong to
Protect Upper-Level Officialsfrom Suit

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,9 4 the Supreme Court modified the existing qualified immunity doctrine in two ways. First, it continued to
narrow the class of government officials entitled to absolute immunity. 95 Second, it discarded the subjective prong of the Scheuer test,
holding that the test for qualified immunity should turn solely on
96
objective factors.
a. Discardingthe Subjective Prong of the Test
After finding that the defendants in Harlow, who included upper-level presidential aides, were not entitled to absolute immunity,
the Court announced that it was discarding the subjective prong of
the qualified immunity doctrine. 97 The new test focused exclusively
on the objective conduct of the official. It shielded the official from
liability so long as his conduct did "not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." '9 8 If the right he violated was not clearly established, this new test would shield the official from liability, even if
the court determined that an actual violation had occurred, and
fled immunity. In 1978, the Court held that the Secretary of Agriculture was entitled to
only qualified immunity. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). In Butz, the plaintiff alleged that the Department of Agriculture had wrongfully initiated administrative
proceedings against him in retaliation for his criticism of the operation of the
Department.
93 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
94 Id. In Harlow, the plaintiff alleged that senior White House aides participated in
a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his due process rights by illegally forcing his
dismissal from a government post.
95 Id. at 812-13. The Court held that Presidential aides generally are entitled only
to qualified immunity. The Court stated that it would grant absolute immunity only in
those exceptional cases where the aide could prove that his duties were of such a sensitive nature that absolute immunity was essential for him to adequately perform them.
Id. "[I]n order to establish entitlement to absolute immunity a Presidential aide first
must show that the responsibilities of his office embraced a function so sensitive as to
require a total shield from liability." Id. at 813-14. Thus, the Court placed the burden
of proving that absolute immunity was justified on the official.
While the Court left open the possibility that a Presidential aide might be absolutely
immune when exercising discretionary authority in the realm of national security, the
Harlow decision basically shut the door on absolute immunity for all officials except the
President, judges, prosecutors and legislators. In ruling against absolute immunity, the
Court explicitly recognized the "functional" nature of immunity law, stating that the
protection it provides should extend "no further than its justification would warrant."
Id. at 810-11.
96 Id. at 817-18.
97 Id. at 817-19.
98

Id. at 819.
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even if the official knew that his conduct violated the individual's
rights. Thus, the Court eliminated the subjective prong of the Wood
test.9 9
99 Id. at 818-19.
Although the Harlow Court discarded the subjective element from the qualified immunity test, it did leave an extraordinary circumstances defense open to the defendant
official at trial. Even if the court found that the official had violated a clearly established
right, he still was entitled to a second line of defense: "if the official pleading the defense
claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have
known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained." Id. at 819.
The Court has not articulated the exact scope or meaning of this ambiguous passage. A close reading of the opinion shows that the concurring justices themselves misunderstood this second line of defense. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that
the extraordinary circumstances defense should "turn primarily on objective factors."
Id. Justice Brennan, writing in concurrence and apparently also referring to the "extraordinary circumstances" defense, wrote that the standard announced by the Court in
Harlow "would not allow the official who actually knows that he is violating the law to
escape liability for his actions, even if he could not 'reasonably have been expected' to
know what he actually did know." Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring). On its face, the
language of the defense, that a defendant prove he "neither knew nor should have
known" of the relevant legal standard, suggests that the test for this defense would include an inquiry into the subjective beliefs of the defendant. A reasonable reading
seems to be that the official can claim immunity-even for a violation of a clearly established right-if he can prove both that he did not know he was committing that violation,
and that due to some unique circumstance he should not reasonably have been expected
to know he was committing it. A full analysis of this exception is beyond the scope of
this Note, but some of the problems and ambiguities are discussed briefly below:
Some lower courts have read the extraordinary circumstances defense as pertaining
to instances in which a defendant relied on legal advice, a statute, or a government
regulation. Unfortunately, these courts have not been clear whether the above situations constitute extraordinary circumstances, or whether they are factors in determining
whether the defendant violated clearly established rights. See, e.g., Arnsberg v. United
States, 757 F.2d 971, 981-82 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (defendant's conduct did not violate
clearly established rights because they reasonably relied on the assessment of an assistant
attorney general as to the validity of the arrest warrants), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010
(1986); King v. City of Fort Wayne, 590 F. Supp. 414, 424-26 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (existence of a state statute that seemed to authorize the officers' actions led the court to
conclude that the officers did not violate a clearly established right of which a reasonable
person should have known); Keefe v. Library of Congress, 588 F. Supp. 778, 792 (D.C.
Dist. 1984) (defendant did not violate clearly established right by enforcing unconstitutionally vague federal regulation, because it was not clear at the time that the defendant
should have known its actions were unconstitutional, and further because thd defendant
was entitled to rely on the advice of the Library of Congress General Counsel.), aff'd on
other grounds, 777 F.2d 1573 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Dehorty v. New Castle County Council,
560 F. Supp. 889, 894 (D. Del. 1983) (fact that attorney for defendant County employers
did not advise does not mean defendants did not know their conduct violated plaintiff's
constitutional rights.); Note, Quick Termination of InsubstantialCivil Rights Claims: Qualified
Immunity and ProceduralFairness, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1555 (1985) (authored by Edmund L. Carey). Compare these with cases where courts have interpreted the "extraordinary circumstances" defense as making this inquiry necessary. See, e.g., Skevofilax
v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 538 (D.NJ. 1984); Heslip v. Lobbs, 554 F.Supp. 694, 70102 (E.D. Ark. 1982). See generally Sheldon H. Namod, ConstitutionalAccountabilityin Section
1983 Litigation, 68 IowA L. REv. 1, 7 (1982).
As used by the courts that read Harlow literally (the second line of cases) the extraordinary circumstances exception shields an official from liability if he can prove at
trial that he both did not subjectively know that he was committing a violation, and that
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Rationalefor Restructuring the Test

In support of this new test, the Harlow Court focused on the
goal of encouraging dismissal of insubstantial claims before trial or
extended discovery to protect government officials from the nuisance of defending against them. 10 0 Under the Harlow test, if the
plaintiff's complaint does not allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, the trial court can dismiss the case on
summary judgment before discovery. 10 1 In the Court's view, the
costs of a subjective good faith inquiry,10 2 and the excessive disruption of government that could result from requiring government officials to defend every suit through the trial process, 10 3 required a
change in the qualified immunity standard to strike a better balance
04
between the needs of government and individual rights.
possibly due to reasonable reliance on a statute, legal advisor, or government regulation, he should not reasonably be expected to have known he was committing the violation. As long as the Court continues to place liability for violations on the official
himself, this second line of defense seems reasonable.
Courts that use the extraordinary circumstances exception to determine whether
the law was clearly established, however, allow the defendant to use a statute, legal opinion or government regulation to set up a conclusive presumption that he did not subjectively know he was violating a clearly established right. This not only contradicts the
clear language of Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819, it also allows the defendant to move for summary judgment on the immunity issue without being required to prove either actual
reliance, or that this reliance was reasonable under the circumstances. In the case of a
state statute, the combination of the absolute immunity of states, coupled with the irrebuttable presumption of reasonable reliance, could combine to leave the plaintiff without a cause of action, even if the court finds that the right violated was clearly
established.
If the Court provided this exception to allow immunity based on reasonable reliance on the constitutionality of a statute, the opinion of general counsel, or government
regulations, then the defense should be allowed. As long as the burden of liability is
placed on the individual official, he should be granted immunity if he can prove that he
reasonably relied on a higher authority. The Supreme Court, however, should clarify
the meaning of the extraordinary circumstances exception to forestall its use as an irrebuttable presumption on summary judgment. An official should not be able to defeat
a valid constitutional claim simply on the grounds that he blindly followed higher authority. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (holding that a police officer was not
shielded from liability in a section 1983 suit simply because ajudge authorized the arrest
warrants, and that the officer was required to exercise his own reasonable judgment as
to whether probable cause existed for requesting the arrest warrants.).
100 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817. Some of the Court's concerns on this point can be
attributed to the facts of Harlow. Discovery in this case lasted for more than eight years.
Another factor may have been the general perception that, due to the broad interpretation the Court had given to Section 1983, civil rights suits were threatening to overwhelm the federal system. This perception has been called into question by recent
empirical studies. See Eisenberg, supra note 26, at 522-56.
101 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
102
Id. at 816.
103
Id. at 818.
104
Id. at 816 ("The subjective element of the good-faith defense frequently has
proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not
proceed to trial.").
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Post-Harlow Developments: Mitchell v. Forsyth10 5

3.

Three years after deciding Harlow, the Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth' 0 6 recharacterized qualified immunity as immunity from suit,
rather than as a shield from liability. The Court also refined its understanding of what constitutes a clearly established constitutional
right. Mitchell arose out of the use of warrantless wiretaps by former
Attorney General John Mitchell-ostensibly for national security
purposes. 0 7 The plaintiff brought suit alleging that these wiretaps
were illegal and violative of his fourth amendment rights. l0 8
The Court first examined the character of Mitchell's qualified
immunity. Recognizing the implications of Harlow, the Court explicitly recharacterized the qualified immunity doctrine as providing
protection from suit, rather than from damages, 09 because immunity is effectively lost if the case erroneously goes to trial. 10 Mitchell's recharacterization followed logically from the Harlow Court's
focus on the desirability of dismissing insubstantial claims before
trial."'I To protect the immunity, which amounted to an entitlement not to stand trial, the court held that a denial of qualified immunity was immediately appealable.'12
The Mitchell Court also refined the clearly established language
from Harlow.' 13 Under Mitchell, for the qualified immunity defense
to fail, the officials' actions must have violated rights that were
clearly established at the time the act was performed.' 1 4 The Court had
ruled that warrantless wiretaps conducted to protect domestic security were unconstitutional six months after Mitchell had discontinued the tap on the plaintiff. 115 The Court stated that, given the
timing of its decision, the right not to be subjected to warrantless
wiretaps was not clearly established at the time that the violation
took place.1 6 The Court left open the question ofjust how "clearly
established" the right had to be, stating in Mitchell only that there
was an "open question" as to whether the wiretap was illegal at the
105

106
107
108
109

472 U.S. 511 (1985).
Id.

Id. at 514.
Id. at 515.

Id. at 526 (The Court noted the explicit aim of the objective standard announced
in Harlow: "to 'permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment ....

.

(quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818)).

110

Id.

111

See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813.
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; see Note, supra note 99, at 1570.
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 531; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535.
See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1972).
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 535.

112
113
114
115
116
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time it was used.1 17
B.

Anderson v. Creighton: The Current Scope of the Qualified
Immunity Doctrine

The process of enlarging the class of officials entitled to qualified immunity, and the use of a one-standard test for immunity, converged in Anderson v. Creighton.t l8 In Creighton, the Court used a
standard developed for upper-level officials to grant immunity to
lower-level officials,' 19 a result that is inconsistent with the policy
interests implicit in the development of the qualified immunity
20
doctrine.1
Creighton arose out of a warrantless search by FBI agents of the
Creightons' home. The agents were looking for Mrs. Creighton's
brother, who was a suspect in an armed robbery. 12 1 According to
the complaint, the agents and several uniformed police officers carrying shotguns appeared at the Creightons' home. 122 They told Mr.
Creighton to "keep his hands in sight" and rushed through the
door, pointing weapons at his wife and yelling at his children. One
of the officers injured Mr. Creighton during the search. Afterwards,
the agents arrested Mr. Creighton, later releasing him without filing
charges. 12 3 The police found no evidence of the suspected fugitive.
The District Court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the agents had probable cause to
conduct the search. 124 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
there was a factual dispute as to whether probable cause existed. 12 5
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the defendants were not entifled to qualified immunity because freedom from warrantless
searches, conducted without probable cause, is a clearly established
12 6
constitutional right.
117
Id. The Court noted that such wiretaps had been used by six successive administrations. See also Note, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard
for Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 901, 923-33 (1984). The
author sets out three possible interpretations of the clearly established test from Harlow:
1) requiring "strict factual correspondence" to a prior case; 2) requiring the defendant
to be aware of general legal principles applied to analogous cases; and 3) requiring the
defendant to anticipate new legal developments. The Note author favors the middle
approach.
118 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
119 See id. at 638-39.
120
See supra text accompanying notes 60-74.
121 Creighton, 483 U.S. at 637.
122 Id. at 664 n.21 (Steven, J., dissenting).

123
124

Id.

Id. at 637.
125 Creighton v. City of St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1275 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. grantedsub
nom. Anderson v. Creighton, 478 U.S. 1003 (1986), vacated, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
126 Id. at 1272-77. The Court subsequently clarified the clearly established test in
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The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on the qualified immunity issue. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, applied
the objective standard test, which had been developed in cases involving upper-level government officials, 12 7 to decide that the defendant was entitled to immunity from the action. The majority
declared that the officer's subjective state of mind was irrelevant to
the qualified immunity inquiry under the rules established in
Harlow.128 In applying this test, however, the Court failed to consider that the objective standard test was developed in cases involving upper-level government officials, such as state governors and
cabinet members, whereas this case involved a lower-level official-a
field-level FBI agent.
The Court expressly refused to bifurcate the immunity test between upper- and lower-level officials, citing the goals of simplicity
and certainty.' 29 An immunity standard that varied among different
categories of officials, according to the Court, would lead to precisely the same type of uncertainty that the qualified immunity doctrine sought to avoid. 3 0° Although not stating so explicitly, the
majority was apparently concerned that officials, uncertain of the
type of immunity to which they were entitled, would hesitate to perform their discretionary duties with appropriate vigor.' 3 '
Justice Stevens, in a dissent in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, asserted that the Court, by applying the objective test
to a law enforcement official, had made a major change in existing
law. 13 2 Justice Stevens argued that the Harlow standard did not apCreighton, 483 U.S. at 640 ("The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."). In
Creighton, this test meant that the plaintiff not only must show that he had a clearly established fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, but also
that the actions taken by the agent were such that a reasonable officer would know that
the search was unreasonable. The plaintiff argued that because the search was found to
be unreasonable for fourth amendment purposes, it could not have been reasonable for
the purpose of the clearly established test. The Court dismissed this contention as
based on a "mere semantic fortuity." Id. at 643-45; see Kathryn R. Urbanya, Problematic
Standards of Reasonableness: QualifiedImmunity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer's Use
of Excessive Force, 62 TEmp. L. REV. 61 (1989); see also Note, The Supreme Court-Leading
Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 220 (1987).
127 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511 (United States Attorney General); Harlow, 457 U.S. 800
(Presidential aides).
128 Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641.
129 Id. at 643.
130 Id. Although not articulated clearly in the opinion, Justice Scalia apparently is
referring to the pre-immunity situation in which officials could be held liable, even if

acting in good faith, if it later turned out that their actions violated the plaintiffs rights.
131 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S 232, 240 (1974) (without immunity, a danger
would exist that the threat of liability would render an official less willing to execute his
office with the decisiveness necessary to serve the public good).
132 Creighton, 483 U.S. at 647 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ply to the case of a police officer accused of violating an individual's
fourth amendment rights. 13 3 He noted that the policy concerns behind the Harlow Court's restructuring of the qualified immunity doctrine were attenuated in suits against law enforcement agents.13 4 In
contrast with upper-level officials, law enforcement agents are frequently called upon to testify in court. Consequently, participation
in litigation would not greatly disrupt their everyday duties. 13 5 Stevens also noted that the political restraints, such as scrutiny by the
press and Congress, that deter upper-level officials from engaging
in unconstitutional conduct generally are missing from the day-today lives of lower-level law enforcement officials.' 3 6 According to
Justice Stevens, by mechanically applying a level of protection
designed for a different group of government officials to lower-level
7
officials, the Court announced "a new rule of law."'1
III
Creighton: LOGICAL

RESULT OF AN ILLOGICALLY-DEVELOPED

DOCTRINE

Justice Stevens correctly recognized that the Harlow standard
was inappropriate to determine the outcome in Creighton.' 38 The
majority, however, also was correct when it insisted that it did not
make a major change in the law.' 3 9 Instead, the Court applied a
doctrine that had developed haphazardly in response to conflicting,
ill-defined policy goals.
The Court developed the concept of qualified immunity in the
context of unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement
officials.' 40 The two-prong test, requiring a subjective good faith
belief that also was objectively reasonable, adequately protected law
enforcement officials from the hardship of strict liability for civil
rights violations. As the Court added upper-level government officials to the qualified immunity pool, 14 1 however, new policy considerations arose.' 4 2 These new considerations produced a tension in
the doctrine. If courts force upper-level officials to prove subjective
good-faith, which often requires a full trial, the costs to effective
133
134

Id. at 648 (StevensJ, dissenting).
Id. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

135

Id. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

136
137
138
139

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

140

See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

at
at
at
at

662
647
648
641

n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
n.3.

141 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511 (United States Attorney General); Harlow, 457 U.S. 800
(high-level aides to President Nixon); Butz, 438 U.S. 478 (Secretary and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture); Scheuer, 416 U.S. 232 (Governor of Ohio).
142 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-15.
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government are greater than if lower-level officials are required to
make this showing. 143 This tension led to Harlow's recharacterization of the test.' 44 But the Court's refusal to bifurcate the standard
extended too much protection to lower-level officials.
A logical consequence of the Court's contraction of absolute
immunity was a corresponding broadening of the class of officials
entitled to qualified immunity.' 4 5 As this immunity covered more
upper-level government officials, 146 the Court had to change the
character and strength of the protection provided by the qualified
immunity doctrine to fit the new policy considerations that came
14 7
into play.
The Court's greatest concern was protecting government offi148
cials from the burden of defending against insubstantial claims.
This concern is justified for two reasons. First, the actions of upperlevel officials often affect a much larger class of individuals than do
those of lower-level officials. The larger plaintiff pool increases the
likelihood that the upper-level official's decisiori would cause someone to feel injured enough to bring suit. Second, upper-level officials' positions involve a much greater degree of responsibility than
do those of lower-level officials. Thus, the cost-in terms of effective governmental efficiency-of requiring upper-level officials to
take time away from their official duties to prove subjective goodfaith is too high a price to pay for the added increment of accountability. In response to these concerns, the Harlow Court discarded
49
the subjective element of the qualified immunity test.'
143

144
145
146
147
148

149

See infra text accompanying notes 156-59.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-15.
See supra text accompanying notes 83-117.
See Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511; Harlow, 457 U.S. 800.
See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-15.

Id. at 814.
Id. at 814, 817-18.

By limiting the immunity test to objective criteria, the Court hoped to encourage
the dismissal of claims at an early stage of litigation. Id. at 818. Under the law, unless
the complaint demonstrates on its face that the right violated was clearly established, the
lower court should dismiss the claim prior to discovery. Id at 817. By discarding the
subjective element, the Court pragmatically shifted the balance further in favor of the
government official by protecting those officials who did, in fact, violate an individual's
rights, even though subjectively believing that they were committing such a violation.
By announcing that the qualified immunity doctrine was an immunity from suit rather
than damages, the Mitchell Court simply recognized the effect of the Harlow decision and
the policy concerns it addressed. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526. When the immunity test
contained a subjective prong, a trial virtually always was necessary, once the plaintiff
passed the threshold requirement of having stated a claim of an actual violation. The
Harlow Court wanted to limit the number of suits against officials that went to trial; the
additional protection for defendants was only a byproduct. By discarding the subjective
element, the Court hoped that a larger number of insubstantial claims would be dismissed, on the basis of the official's immunity, before discovery or trial. What the Mitchell Court recognized was that it was immunity from trial-before discovery even began-
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Although the Court strengthened the qualified immunity standard to fit the needs of the new entries into the qualified immunity
pool, it chose not to distinguish between the particular needs of
each group of officials by breaking the qualified immunity doctrine
into different levels. 150 Throughout the development of the qualified immunity doctrine, the Court has framed the test for immunity
as a uniform standard. The Wood'-5 1 standard never distinguished
among classes of officials; it merely applied a two-pronged test to all
officials entitled to qualified immunity. 15 2 Harlow expressly discarded the subjective prong of the Wood standard, 5 3 and at no point
since overruling Wood has the Court distinguished between upperand lower-level officials. However, the Court's own rationale for reducing the scope of absolute immunity-that immunity should be
granted only to the extent necessary for the effective functioning of
govemment' 54 -mandates
distinguishing between upper- and
lower-level officials.
Viewed in the light of its development, the Court's application
of the Harlow qualified immunity standard in Creighton was not a departure from past precedent. Rather, it represented the straightforward application of a one-standard doctrine that had simply
grown too unwieldy to be applied to the case before it. By refusing
to subdivide the qualified immunity standard, while at the same time
applying the doctrine to increasingly diverse categories of officials,
the Court created a standard that causes needless and unfair dismis15 5
sal of many civil rights actions.
From a societal point of view, lower-level officials do not require protection from suit156 because of the limited number of indithat was the main focus of the new test. This recognition led the Mitchell Court to hold
that the denial of a qualified immunity claim was immediately appealable.
150 See Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641.
151 Wood, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
152

See id. at 321.

See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-16.
See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 520; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812.
155 Justice Stevens's assertion that the Court made a new law by applying the Harlow
standard to law enforcement officials is correct in the sense that the Supreme Court never
did so. The lower courts, however, have consistently applied Harlow in cases involving
civil rights violations by police officers. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (ist
Cir. 1987); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Hill v. Bogans,
735 F.2d 391 (10th Cir. 1984); Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1982); Saldana v.
Garza, 684 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1982).
156 Two additional problems with the current Harlow standard are beyond the scope
of this Note, but should be mentioned briefly: 1) the ambiguity of the extraordinary
circumstances exception, and 2) the lack of guidance provided by Harlow in cases where
unconstitutional motive is an issue in the plaintiff's case. For a discussion of the extraordinary circumstances exception, see supra note 99.
In cases involving unconstitutional motive as an element of the plaintiff's claim,
Harlow's purely objective test does not provide any guidance-and indeed has no appli153
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viduals who would be likely to bring suit against them, and the

cation. Such cases can include equal protection claims, in which the plaintiff is required
to show purposeful discrimination, see Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239
(1976); eighth amendment violations, in which the plaintiff is required to show "deliberate indifference," see, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); and claims that
facially valid conduct was unconstitutional due to impermissible motive, which includes
first amendment violations (a governmental official fires an employee due to his or her
political affiliation), or the warrantless search of a prisoner's cell (permissible if conducted for the purpose of prison security, but not to further prosecution of the prisoner). See United States v. Vallez, 653 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 904
(1981).
Harlow's inapplicability to suits involving unconstitutional motive has left the lower
courts to fend for themselves in trying to form a standard that adequately balances the
needs of the government with those of the individual. In practice, the lower courts have
dealt with the problem in three ways. Some courts have read Harlow literally as foreclosing any inquiry into the defendant's subjective state of mind. As a result, a defendant
who claims that his motive was permissible, and can provide any evidence tending to
prove that motivation, is automatically granted qualified immunity on summary judgment. Other courts have gone in the opposite direction, holding that Harlow does not
apply in cases where unconstitutional motive is an issue. These courts require a trial on
the merits when a factual conflict exists over the defendant's motives. They allow the
jury to determine the defendant's actual motivation. See Acoffv. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543,
1550 (l1th Cir. 1985); Kenyatta v. Moore, 744 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1066 (1985).
Most recently, several lower courts, see Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct. of S.E. Judicial
Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1050 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted and vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1736
(1989), and Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479-81 (5th Cir. 1985), have followed the
approach developed by the D.C. Circuit in Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985), and Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep't, 812
F.2d 1425 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g granted, vacated in part, 817 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir.), reinstated on
reconsideration,824 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Hobson, the district court held that for
a plaintiff to avoid dismissal of his claim, he must provide more than nonconclusory
allegations of an unconstitutional motive. See Hobson, 737 F.2d at 29. In Martin, the
court clarified Hobson, holding that a plaintiff must allege "some direct evidence that the
officials' actions were improperly motivated." Martin, 812 F.2d at 1435. Martin also
stated that if the trial court found that the complaint did not meet this standard, the trial
judge should, at his discretion, allow narrow discovery into the issue of the defendant's
motivation. Id. at 1437-38.
Despite the confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to
address the applicability of Harlow to cases in which unconstitutional motive is an element of the substantive violation. Instead of ignoring the problem, the Court should
follow the lead of the lower courts by establishing pleading requirements and some
guidelines as to the permissible scope of discovery. The method developed by the D.C.
Circuit in Martin, 812 F.2d 1425, and Hobson, 737 F.2d 1-requiring some specificity of
pleading and allowing for narrow discovery-is a good model upon which to build. A
statement by the Court on these issues is necessary, however, to end the confusion
among the circuits, and to lead to a more uniform application of the qualified immunity
standard to these types of cases. Compare Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct. of S.E.Judicial Dist.,
838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that summary judgment can be avoided if pleading is specific), cert. granted and vacated, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989); Martin, 812 F.2d 1425;
Hobson, 737 F.2d 1 (same); with Elliot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985) (requiring
an extremely detailed complaint.); Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 F.2d 401 (8th Cir. 1984)
(granting summary judgment on grounds of immunity even though complaint stated
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limited scope of these officials' responsibilities.1 5 7 In addition, in
the case of law enforcement officials, testifying at trial is often a normal part of their job. 5 8 In short, it is unlikely that lower-level officials would be unable to perform their duties because of a deluge of
civil rights suits or that their involvement in a suit would seriously
impede the effective operation of government.1 5 9
Thus, by failing to distinguish between different categories of
public officials, the current standard provides too much protection
to many lower-level officials. The Court has failed to balance individual rights and governmental efficiency in a precisely tailored
way.1 60 Lower-level officials, who do not require the level of protection granted by Harlow,1 6 1 receive a windfall of unnecessary protecthat dismissal from employment was due to plaintiff's political affiliations); Egger v. Phillips, 710 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1983).
Beyond eliminating insubstantial claims during discovery, it is impossible to shield
government officials at any level from the necessity of defending against suits alleging
unconstitutional motives. The particularly offensive nature of these violations, however,
plus the lack of any alternative short of leaving the plaintiff without a remedy, justifies
the added cost to the system. In unconstitutional motive cases, the official is accused of
intentionally using his grant of state power to violate an individual's civil rights. This
type of violation is so odious that it overbalances Harlow's concern with protecting the
official from the inconveniences of the trial process. If a specific pleading of nonconclusory allegations and narrow discovery make out a prima facie case, the official should
be required to prove that he did not act on unconstitutional motives. The Harlow standard for high level officials should leave open a small niche in which an individual can
force a public official to go through the inconvenience of qualified discovery.. Also, because literal application of Harlow will lead to summary judgment before discovery, the
standard must be modified for unconstitutional motive cases if the plaintiff is to retain
any right to a remedy.
For a more comprehensive exploration of the problem, see Stephanie E. Balcerzak,
Qualified Immunity for Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil
Rights Litigation, 95 YALE LJ. 126 (1985).
157 Officials are granted qualified immunity from suit for the benefit of society (i.e.,
effective government), not for the individual official. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 242. Since
lower-level officials, depending on the classification, deal directly with the public, only
those individuals with whom they had direct contact would be likely to bring suit for a
civil rights violation resulting from the exercise of the official's discretionary duties.
And, since lower-level officials are by definition one of many, the time taken to defend
against the suit will not greatly inhibit the smooth functioning of government.
158
Creighton, 483 U.S. at 661-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Stevens's view, the necessity of defending a civil rights action will not seriously impede law enforcement officers from performing their duties, because testifying in court is a routine part of a
police officer's job.
159
For a contrary view, see Schuck, supra note 12, at 295-315. Schuck argues that
the nature of discretionary duties usually exercised by "street level" officials-which are
generally not closely supervised, involve extensive public contact, and a high risk of
harm-not only carry a greater opportunity for civil rights violations (and thus the threat
of liability), but also a greater opportunity for officials to fail to act for fear of that
liability.
160
For a fuller discussion of this problem, and the suggestion that another possible
remedy would be bifurcation of the qualified immunity doctrine into two separate standards, see infra text accompanying notes 200-15.
161 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18.

1990]

NOTE-QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

485

tion. As a consequence, many victims are needlessly left without a
remedy. 162
IV
REFORMING THE CURRENT STANDARD

Remedying the problem of the overprotection of lower-level officials requires broad reform of the qualified immunity doctrine.
Two avenues of reform would provide good solutions: 1) complete
abrogation of qualified immunity for lower-level officials in favor of
insurance and indemnification; and 2) creation of a bifurcated standard to track more closely the needs of both the government and
individual plaintiffs. Under either alternative, the Court should continue to grant qualified immunity to upper-level officials under the
163
current Harlow standard.
A.

Complete Abrogation of Qualified Immunity for LowerLevel Officials in Favor of Insurance and
Indemnification

The most sweeping, and ultimately most satisfying, long-term
reform of the qualified immunity doctrine would be its eventual abrogation for lower level officials in view of the increasing availability
of insurance and government indemnification programs for damages stemming from section 1983 and Bivens claims.
In Creighton, the plaintiff argued that the growing availability of
insurance for damage claims arising from civil rights suits undercuts
the rationale for the qualified immunity doctrine.' 6 4 Justice Scalia,
however, dismissed this argument, implying in part that the risk of
governmental liability would produce the same hesitation to act as
would holding the official individually liable.1 65 He also noted that
existing state and federal reimbursement programs are not sufficiently certain or available to justify a change in the Harlow
66
standard. 1
1. The Current Availability of Insurance and Indemnification
Few states indemnify or insure their officials specifically for
162
This "windfall," however, is granted at public expense-in the form of a needless denial of remedy for constitutional violations.
163 The need to protect high-level officials from defending every suit at trial stems
from the greater number of possible plaintiffs who may bring suit as the result of a single
decision, and the greater cost-in societal terms-of requiring these officials to take time

away from their official duties to prove their subjective good-faith. See supra text accom-

panying notes 139-49.
164
165

Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641-42 n.3.
Id.

166

Id.
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damages assessed in section 1983 actions. 16 7 Similarly, there is no
general provision for either insurance or indemnification of federal
officials. 168 A majority of states, however, have passed more general
statutes either allowing or mandating insurance' 69 or indemnification 170 of different classes of public officials. Moreover, although
most of the indemnification statutes and insurance policies issued
pursuant to statute have various limitations as to the types and
167
Only two states currently have indemnification statutes that explicitly cover civil
rights damages. See LA. REV. STAT. § 13:5108.1 & 2 (West Supp. 1985) (state officials
and employees indemnified for damages under section 1983 provided the act was not
intentional or the product of gross negligence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 31:105 & 106
(Equity Pamph. 1983) (indemnification permissible for civil rights violations as long as
not committed with malice).
168 The Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2672)
(West Supp. 1989)), provides a form of defacto indemnification by authorizing federal
liability for actions of its officials that would be torts under state law. Because of its
numerous exceptions, including acts which fall within the official's "discretionary functions or duties," it is not very helpful in the Bivens context.
169 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-497 (1977), 41-621(A)(3) (West Supp. Pamph.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-115, Rule 3.4(b)-10-116 (1982); O.C.G.A. § 45-9-1
(1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 85, para. 9-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. Pamph. 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-611 (1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8103(3) (1980); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 21-15-6 (Harrison Supp. 1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:107 (Equity Supp. Pamph.

1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.1-15 (Allen Smith Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 307.441 (Anderson Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 278.100 (1981); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-11-140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-406 (1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63-30-33 (Allen Smith Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 1092, tit. 29,
§ 1406 (Equity Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-39(b) (1980); W. VA. CODE § 8-12-7
(1984).
170

See ALA. CODE § 41-9-74 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-621 (West Supp.

1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3401 (Michie supp. Pamph. 1985); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§§ 824, 825 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-110(1)(b)(1) (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 4-16a & 7-465 (West Supp. Pamph. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4001 to
4002 (Michie Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. § 111.071 (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-9-60
(1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-903(b) & (c) (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24 para. 1-4-5, ch. 85
para. 9-102 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-5 (Bums Supp.
1985); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 25A.21, 25A.22 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-

6101 to 6116 (1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:5108.1, 13:5108.2 (West Supp. 1985);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112 (1980); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 12-404, 12405 (1984); MICH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 691.1408 (West Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 25-1-47(2) (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 105-710-711 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-9-305 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.0349, 41.035 (Michie 1983); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:105, 31:106, 99D:2 (Equity Pamph. 1983); NJ. STAT. ANN.

§§ 59:10-1-4 (1982); N.M.

STAT.

ANN. §§ 41-4-4, 22, 23, 25 (1982 and 1985 Supp.); N.Y.

GEN. MUN. LAw § 50-j. & N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 17(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 160A-167; OR. REV. STAT. § 30.285 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-31-12

(Michie Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-230(d) (Lawyer's Co-op. 1984); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 3-19-1-2 (1980); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 104.002(2) (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-36-37 (Allen Smith Supp.
1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 1103 (Equity Cum. Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 8-12-7(b)
(1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.46 (1983 & West Supp. 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 1-39-104
(Michie Supp. 1985). See also 5 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 78, § 29.9;
Schuck, supra note 12, at 335-37.
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amounts of damages they cover, 171 on their face they apply to section 1983 damages. 172 At present, these programs are insufficient
to replace qualified immunity, 173 but they do show a willingness on
the part of state and local entities to protect their public officials.
The slow growth of the government reimbursement programs
actually may be attributable to the Court's strengthening of the
qualified immunity doctrine. As long as the doctrine provides such
a broad scope of protection, there is little incentive for public officials to push for more widespread insurance and indemnification
programs. Further, regardless of the direct causal link between the
two, if the Court were to announce the imminent abrogation of
qualified immunity for lower-level officials, then states surely would
develop these programs.
The reaction by municipalities to state court abrogation of municipal immunity for tort claims-the passage of measures to conform to the change-supports this argument. 174 By signalling the
demise of sovereign immunity for state and local governments, the
state courts, in effect, compelled city and state legislatures to act. By
171
Virtually all of the indemnification statutes, and most personal injury policies
purchased by government entities, exclude indemnification or coverage for "bad-faith"
or "willful" violations. In addition, most cover only compensatory, not punitive, damages. See Donald J. Farley, Insurance Coverage in Civil Rights Cases, 20 IDAHo L. REV. 617
(1984); Schuck, supra note 12, at 335-337.
172
Courts have interpreted personal injury policies as covering civil rights claims.
See, e.g., Town of Goshen v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 915, 424 A.2d 822 (N.H.
1980); City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d
513 (1975); see also Farley, supra note 171, at 626-29 (Courts have found personal liability
policies cover civil rights claims when they do not explicitly exclude those claims).
173 Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641-42 n.3. The statute's insufficiency stems from the various limitations and conditions that often are attached to indemnification or insurance
coverage. Some of the statutes contain dollar limitations, condition indemnification on
good-faith cooperation with the defense, or exclude indemnification for officials acting
in bad-faith. In addition, many of these statutes cover only specific types of actions
against a narrow class of officials, and many do not specifically address liability under
federal civil rights laws, rendering their application to Section 1983 actions uncertain.
In sum, the existing insurance and indemnification statutes are neither widespread
enough nor comprehensive enough to immediately and fully replace qualified immunity.
States and the federal government will have to enact more complete coverage to replace
qualified immunity. See Schuck, supra note 12.
174 A good example of this is the process by which the Minnesota Supreme Court
signalled the impending end of sovereign immunity to the city of St. Paul. In Nissen v.
Redelack, 246 Minn. 63, 74 N.W.2d 300 (1955), the court reluctantly denied recovery to
the parents of an 8-year-old boy who drowned in a municipally operated swimming
pool. Agreeing with the trial court that there was ample evidence to warrant a jury in
finding that the city of St. Paul was negligent in its operation of the pool, the court
nevertheless held that since "it has long been the settled law in this state that municipalities are not liable for negligence in the performance of governmental functions," the
plaintiff's claim was barred. Id. at 89, 74 N.W.2d at 304.
The court noted the injustice of allowing the municipality to avoid responsibility for
its own negligence under the cloak of sovereign immunity, but noted that "it is not the
function of the courts to pass laws in this respect, and any change in this policy must

CORNELL LI W REVIEW

488

[Vol. 75:462

signalling a determination to abrogate the qualified immunity doctrine for lower-level public officials, the Court could accomplish the
same result-in effect forcing the federal and state governments to
provide for comprehensive insurance or indemnification programs
for these officials.
Although abrogating qualified immunity for lower-level officials
might force the hand of state and federal legislatures, it does not
amount to judicial usurpation of the legislative function. The qualified immunity doctrine from its inception was a creation of the
Court.' 75 Faced with the broad language of section 1983, which on
its face does not provide for any official immunity,' 7 6 the Court attempted to develop a system of protection that would provide the
best balance between individual rights and the smooth operation of
government.i 7 7 However, the confusion in the lower courts,' 7 8 the
inapplicability of the doctrine to a broad category of cases, 1 79 and
the current overprotection of lower-level officialsis ° make it apparent that the Court's attempt to achieve the desired balance has
failed. By announcing the pending abrogation of qualified immunity for lower-level officials, the Court would be discarding the
product of twenty-two years ofjudicial legislation. This abrogation
would force the state and federal governments to confront an issue
that should not have been delegated to the Court in the first place.
2.

The Vicarious Liability Limitation Does Not Prevent Abrogation of
Qualified Immunity for Lower-Level Officials

The Court's position that municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable for section 1983 violations should not limit its ability to
abrogate qualified immunity for lower-level officials-although this
come from the legislature." The Minnesota Court thus left the door open for the legislature to act. Id. at 90, 74 N.W.2d at 304.
The Minnesota Court waited seven years for the legislature to modify the statutory
sovereign immunity doctrine. Then, in Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621,
264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962), the court abrogated the doctrine prospectively-to commence after the adjournment of the 1963 Minnesota Legislature. The
Spanel opinion demonstrated the court's frustration caused by the legislature's failure to
act: "Since we have repeatedly proclaimed that this defense is based on neither justice
or reason, the time is now at hand when corrective measures should be taken by either
legislative or judicial fiat." Id. at 285, 118 N.W.2d at 799. Before the time limit expired,
the St. Paul City Council adopted a statute providing for limited municipal liability for
tort claims.
175
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1967); see also supra text accompanying
notes 74-82.
176
See supra note 25.
177
See supra text accompanying notes 60-73.
178
See supra note 156.
179
See supra note 156.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 156-62.
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action would indirectly compel the development of widespread indemnification and insurance programs. In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,'" the Supreme Court held that a
local government, while included in the definition of the word "person" in section 1983, could not be held vicariously liable solely because it employed the individual tortfeasor.' 82 The Court's
conclusion rested upon the language of section 1983,183 and Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment,' 84 which would have
imposed liability on any "county, city, or parish" for any injury
85
caused by the citizens of that municipal entity.'
Neither the language of section 1983, nor Congress' rejection
of the Sherman Amendment, however, should be construed to prohibit the Court from abrogating a doctrine it developed, even if such
action would force governmental entities to provide indemnification
for their officials. The Monell decision rested on the conclusion that
Congress had not intended to impose vicarious liability upon governmental entities. 186 Monell did not proscribe the voluntary assumption of such liability.' 87 By announcing the prospective abrogation
of qualified immunity, the Court would simply be removing an illconceived cushion that enabled governmental entities to avoid paying the costs imposed by both section 1983 and Bivens for constitutional violations committed by their officials.' 8 8 In the absence of
qualified immunity, society will pay these costs, either by increasing
the salaries of lower-level officials to compensate them for the risk
of liability, or by providing insurance or indemnification. Insurance
and indemnification programs are the most attractive alternative, as
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id. at 691-92. The Court recently refined this point, holding that a local school
district could be held liable in a Section 1983 claim only if the officials who committed
the violation had been delegated policy-making authority or acted pursuant to a wellsettled custom that represented official policy. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
183
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 ("Any person who, under color of any law .... shall
subject or cause to be subected.. .") (emphasis added). The Court took this language to
mean that section 1983 was intended to impose liability only on the "person" directly
responsible for the violation.
184 See Monell, 476 U.S. at 691-94 (Appendix), 702-08 (Powell, J., concurring).
185 Id. at 702 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Sherman Amendment).
186 See id. at 692.
187
See supra notes 169-70 (pertaining to insurance indemnification statutes in which
state and local governments have, in essence, assumed vicarious liability for the acts of
their officials).
188 In the absence of qualified immunity, governmental entities would have been
forced to either insure/indemnify their employees, or pay them enough that they could
bear the risk of liability. With the advent of qualified immunity, governmental entities
were allowed to avoid the "price" of civil rights violations-at the expense of the plaintiff left without a remedy.
181

182
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9

Insurance and Indemnity Programs Spread the Cost of Civil
Rights Violations

The requirement' 9 0 that state and federal governments provide
insurance or indemnification for certain categories of officials would
add a significant extra cost to the system. However, if the rationale
for protecting public officials from civil rights damages is that it is
the necessary price of effective government, 19' it would be more
equitable to spread this cost throughout society by requiring state
and federal governments to insure or indemnify their officials.
Someone must pay the "price" of efficient government. Currently,
that price is borne by the individual plaintiff, who is often left without a remedy in the face of a qualified immunity defense. Widespread and comprehensive insurance or indemnification programs
would shift this burden to society as a whole. Lower-level government officials would be protected against personal liability (perhaps
with an exception for "malicious intent"); victims would retain a
remedy for violations; and the cost of providing insurance would be
borne more equitably by taxes collected from the society at large. 192
This cost-spreading approach is distinct from the growing trend
in common-law tort doctrine to assign liability to the party who can
most clearly prevent the loss. 193 If the rationale for protecting public
189
This follows from the natural tendency of most individuals to be risk averse. The
individual government official will tend to overestimate the risk of being sued and thus
insist on overcompensation for that risk. Of course, government officials could insure
themselves individually against the risk of suit. However, assuming that the officials
would demand compensation to cover the cost of this insurance, it would still be
cheaper to require the government to provide the coverage. The government, by pooling the risk of its employees liability, would be better able to predict the year-to-year
"cost" of liability. It would therefore be able to more closely tailor its insurance coverage to its needs. For an analysis in the context of the purchase of insurance, see WALTER
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 205-19 (3d.
ed. 1985).
190 See supra text accompanying notes 164-66. State and federal governments would
be "required" to provide insurance or indemnification simply because it would be less
costly than paying each individual official to bear the risk of liability without immunity.
191 See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
192
This method of spreading the costs of safeguarding individual rights may not be
the most efficient in economic terms. Generally, only compensatory damages are available in section 1983 actions, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), and often these
damages-particularly in unreasonable search and seizure cases-are minimal. Nonetheless, if these constitutional guarantees are to be taken seriously, then we should be
willing to incur such slight additional costs to provide a remedy for an individual whose
rights have been violated.
193 See generally Lester W. Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of
Certain Types of Tort Cases, 78 U. PA. L. REv. 805 (1930); Robert E. Keeton, Conditional
Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 (1959); Clarence Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172 (1952).
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officials from civil rights liability is to promote effective government, 9 4 providing insurance and indemnification programs imposes the costs on the beneficiaries-society as a whole. Since each
individual within society reaps some of the benefit that flows from
an effectively run government, it follows that the price should be
parceled out among these individuals, rather than placed on the unlucky individual who is left without a remedy. Shifting the burden of
protecting public officials is not a call for government largesse, but
rather a recognition that the costs of that protection should be commensurate with the benefits. 19 5
4.

Insurance Indmnity Programs Will Not Unduly Inhibit Public
Officials

The Creighton Court rejected the insurance alternative on the
ground that, in addition to existing programs being inadequate, the
risk of government liability would inhibit officials in the performance of
their duties.' 9 6 To the extent that any degree of liability will cause
hesitation, the majority is probably correct. Indeed, while the possibility of governmental liability for the official's violation would not
provide the same level of deterrence as would the threat of personal
liability, the potential adverse effects on the official's career of frequent and costly constitutional violations would, no doubt, lead to a
certain level of hesitancy.
This objection, however, begs the question. Taking the Court's
reasoning to its logical conclusion, all officials should be absolutely
immune because anything short of absolute immunity would, to
some extent, inhibit public officials in the performance of their duties. The real question is how much the Court should sacrifice individual rights for the sake of effective government. In making this
determination, the Court should consider the importance that both
the Constitution and our democratic society place on individual
rights. The Bivens Court recognized the primacy of these rights
when it declared that " '[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury.' 1197
194 See, e.g., Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240. Economically, providing for insurance and indemnification programs also puts the costs of violations on the least cost avoider and
internationalizes the insurance pool.
195 Another argument for shifting liability away from the individual official is that the
governmental entity is better suited to take action to avoid recurrence of the violation.
See Newman, supra note 45 at 457; Schuck, supra note 12, at 349.
196 Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641 n.3. Justice Scalia's rejection of insurance on this
ground is an implicit antecedent to his point concerning the lack of comprehensive insurance coverage: "[E]ven assuming that conscientious officials care only about their
personal liability and not the liability of the government they serve ...." Id.
197 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803)).
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The Court often has recognized that the qualified immunity
198
doctrine represents an unfortunate but necessary compromise.
In this regard, the increased hesitation which may accompany an official's pondering about the adverse effects of an insurance claim
would be justified by the vindication of an individual's constitutional
rights. Comprehensive insurance and indemnification programs for
lower-level officials would enable individuals to maintain their right
to a remedy and, at the same time, protect society from the ill effects
of holding individual officials personally liable. The Supreme Court
should therefore encourage these programs as an alternative to
qualified immunity for lower-level government officials.
Subjecting upper-level government officials to civil rights
claims implicates a special set of policy considerations. 199 The possibility that an official could be inundated by a great number of suits
stemming from a single action, and the cost to effective government
of forcing such officials to defend each suit at trial, indicate that insurance and indemnification programs are not an adequate solution
in this context. For these officials, the Court should retain the
Harlow standard of qualified immunity.
B.

An Alternative Solution: Creating a Bifurcated Standard

Short of the complete abrogation of qualified immunity for
lower-level government officials, the Court should at a minimum
recognize that different policy considerations apply to different categories of government officials. Because the purpose of the qualified
immunity doctrine is to promote effective government at some cost
to the rights of individuals, 20 0 the protection afforded officials
should be closely tailored to their needs. The Court consistently
has relied on this pragmatic rationale to deny government officials
absolute immunity. 20 1 The Court should recognize that the same
rationale mandates the bifurcation of the qualified immunity standard to ensure that it protects individuals "no further than its justifi2 02
cation would warrant."
1. Lower-Level Officials: The Wood Standard
Law enforcement and many other lower-level officials do not
require the protection from suit that the current standard pro198 Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506-12 (1978); Harlow,
457 U.S. at 807.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 141-47.
200
See supra text accompanying notes 64-73.
201
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807-12.
202

Id. at 811.
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vides. 203 Because the decisions of lower-level officials tend to affect
only those with whom they have direct contact, the number of potential plaintiffs is much smaller. 20 4 Moreover, because a lowerlevel official is generally one of many, the time he spends defending
205
each suit will not impose an excessive burden on the government.
For these reasons, requiring lower-level officials to defend against
civil suits would not unduly disrupt the operation of the
government.
Thus, the doctrine's rationale and the needs of the government
dictate that lower-level officials should be granted immunity only if
they satisfy both the objective and subjective prongs of the Wood
standard. To claim immunity, a lower-level official should be required to establish both that he did not violate a clearly established
constitutional right, and that he sincerely believed his action did not
violate that right. 20 6 Because the plaintiff must demonstrate an actual violation of his constitutional rights to satisfy his initial burden
of proof, this standard will not attach liability if the official erroneously believed he was violating an individual's rights, but no violation actually occurred. 20 7 However, the application of this standard
would deny immunity in cases where the right actually violated was
not sufficiently clear to pass the objective test if the official believed
that, in fact, he was violating the individual's constitutional rights.
This reduced level of protection for lower-level officials more
closely meets both the needs of the government, and the policy
objectives inherent in holding officials liable for constitutional violations. Because their need for protection is not as great as that of
upper-level officials, lower-level officials should be afforded a degree of immunity which infringes less on the individual's right to a
remedy. A return to the Wood standard would immunize lower-level
officials against damages so long as they exercised due care in the
performance of their duties and did not knowingly violate an individual's rights. This standard is not so demanding as to unduly inhibit an official in exercising his discretion. It is important for
officials to be duly restrained, as the court has made clear in cutting
back on absolute immunity. 208 A recognition that public officials do
err 209 should not be turned into an encouragement that they do so.
203
Id. at 818. This view is in contrast to the dual rationale of effective government
and individual fairness upon which the original standard was developed. Compare
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 240.
204
See supra note 12.
205
Regarding law enforcement officials, Justice Stevens noted that testifying at trial
is a routine part of their duties. See Creighton, 483 U.S. at 662 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975).
207
In other words, there will be no liability for "bad intent" alone.
208
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
209
See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 242.
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For upper-level government officials, the qualified immunity
standard should remain substantially the same as that articulated in
Harlow. As Harlow and Mitchell noted, certain government officials
require protection from both suit and damages, to enable them adequately to execute their duties. 2 10 These considerations make it
necessary to provide upper-level officials with a greater degree of
immunity.
2.

Uncertainty Is Not Fatal to the Bifurcated Standard

In Creighton, the Court refused to bifurcate the qualified immunity test, arguing that the uncertainty of a multi-level standard
would defeat the purpose of qualified immunity. 2 1 1 This Note has
assumed the existence of clear distinctions between upper-level and
lower-level officials but, under a bifurcated system, an official near
the border between the two categories (mid-level official) might be
unsure which standard he would be held to. This uncertainty, however, should not affect his decision whether to take a particular action. 2 12 If an official subjectively believes that his actions will violate
another's constitutional rights, he should abstain from so acting regardless of the applicable immunity standard. The Harlow standard
does not remove the requirement that an official act in good faith; it
simply establishes a conditional presumption that he did so as long
2 13
as the right involved was not clearly established.
Seen in this light, the uncertainty of a bifurcated standard
should not inhibit mid-level officials from the goodfaith performance
of their duties. 2 14 If an official acts in good faith and with a reasonable belief that his actions do not violate another's constitutional
rights, he will be protected under either standard.
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 525; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
211 See Creighton, 487 U.S. at 642.
212 Uncertainty at the fringes already exists under the current standard. An official
will be denied immunity if the trial court finds, as a matter of law, that his action violated
a clearly established right. Requiring subjective belief does not in any way add to that
210

uncertainty.
213
The decision in Harlow to discard the subjective prong of the qualified immunity
test was not based on a desire to provide immunity for officials who, acting in bad faith,
violated an individual's civil rights. Harlow simply established presumption that if the
official's action did not violate a clearly established right, the law would assume that the
violation was committed in good faith. The Court's decision was based on the need to
promote effective government. It does not confer upon officials a license to act with
complete disregard of their subjective beliefs.
214
There are several responses to Justice Scalia's concern over lower courts' uncertainty regarding applicable standards. First, such uncertainty follows almost any refinement in a developing body of law. Second, the extent of any uncertainty largely depends
on the clarity with which the Court articulates the factors it considers in deciding which
standard to apply. Finally, temporary uncertainty among the lower courts is not a sufficient reason to resist reforming a doctrine which denies individuals the opportunity to
pursue a remedy for violations of their constitutional rights.
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CONCLUSION

The qualified immunity doctrine was developed as a pragmatic
sacrifice of individual rights for the sake of an effectively-run government. As a result, the protection provided by the doctrine
should be closely tailored to the particular needs of different categories of government officials.
The best and most comprehensive solution to the problems
posed by the qualified immunity doctrine would be the complete
abrogation of the qualified immunity doctrine for lower-level officials, which would compel state and federal governments to insure
or indemnify these officials against damages. This solution would
more effectively spread the cost of protecting individual rights while
providing sufficient protection to ensure that lower-level officials are
not unduly inhibited in the performance of their duties.
At the very least, the Court should bifurcate the doctrine and,
in so doing, provide immunity from suit only for those officials who
require that protection to adequately perform their duties. Thus,
immunity for lower-level officials should be granted under the twoprong standard articulated in Wood.
John D. Kirby

